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What's in a Label? FIFRA Regulations and the Preemption of State
Tort Claims of Label Misrepresentation
Indian BrandFarms,Inc. v. Novartis Crop ProtectionInc.'
I. INTRODUCTION

Products available for purchase in the United States have labels
which people read and rely upon for their accuracy. This is particularly
true for products that are potentially dangerous like pesticides. However,
contrary to intuition, it is not always clear what constitutes a label. Some
courts have even expanded the definition of a label to include information
that is not necessarily attached to the product. In fact, there is little
authority that can provide guidance on how to determine what is a label.
In New Jersey, a group of blueberry farmers relied on verbal and oral
representations based on a marketing brochure made about a pesticide
when determining what pesticide to purchase and use.2 The issue in the
case was whether that marketing brochure was considered a "label" or
"labeling," and the circuit court's decision determined whether or not the
Plaintiffs could bring their claims against the pesticide company for
misrepresentation and fraud.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING

The Plaintiffs, a group of blueberry farmers from New Jersey, sued
Novartis Crop Protection, Inc. ("Novartis") claiming a pesticide
manufactured by Novartis damaged their blueberry crops.3 For several
years prior to this suit, the Plaintiffs purchased Novartis pesticides and
mixed them with two fungicideS4 called Captan and Captec in a process
called tank mixing.5 In 1997, Novartis began marketing a new pesticide
'617 F.3d 207 (3d Cir. 2010).
2 Id. at 210.
Id. at 211.
4 A Fungicide is "an agent that destroys fungi." Webster's
School & Office Dictionary
185 (ls ed.1995).
5Novartis, 617 F.3d at 210. Tank mixing is the process
of mixing the fungicides and
insecticides together before spraying the plants. Id.
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called Diazinon AG600 ("AG600") using a brochure which claimed the
product was safer for plants and the environment than the older
pesticides.6 The brochure was sent to scientists and retailers in the area,
who relayed to the farmers through the "Blueberry Bulletin"'7 and a
"twilight meeting," 8 that AG600 was an effective product for their
blueberries.9
The Plaintiffs purchased and applied AG600 utilizing the same
tank mixing process they had applied to the older pesticides.' However,
the farmer's blueberry plants that year suffered many problems and
defects including plant death, blotches and spots.' They sued Novartis
claiming the new pesticide caused these problems with the plants because
of an ionic surfactant1 2 not found in the older pesticides Novartis
produced.' 3 The farmers contend they did not know about the surfactant
and had they known about this change to the pesticide, they would not
have mixed it with the fungicides, due to incompatibility between the
products.
The Plaintiffs sued Novartis in the District Court of New Jersey in
1999 for damages based on five claims: (1) strict liability under the New
Jersey Products Liability Act ("NJPLA") for a design defect contending
Novartis did not warn purchasers that if the pesticide was mixed with a
fungicide it could damage crops; (2) negligence because Novartis did not
adequately
test AG600
before
selling
it; (3)
negligent
misrepresentation/fraud because Novartis advertised the product as safer
and having no adverse effects on plants even though they should have
known that it was potentially hazardous; (4) breach of the New Jersey
Consumer Fraud Act ("NJCFA") because Novartis said the product was
safe for blueberry plants; and (5) a breach of express warranty because
6

Id at 210-11.
Id. at 211. The Blueberry Bulletin is a newsletter published by Rutgers University.
8 The twilight meeting was a meeting of scientists and
farmers to discuss the new
esticide. Id.
Id
'Old at 210.
" Id. at 211.
12 Surfactant is defined by the court as a "surface-active agent" which helps the active
ingredients in the pesticide to spread evenly across the plant. Id. at 211 n.2.
" Id at 211.
7
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Novartis warranted on its label that AG600 would not injure plants.14
Novartis filed for summary judgment claiming that the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act 15 ("FIFRA") preempted all of the
Plaintiffs' claims.' 6 The District Court granted summary judgment for
Novartis on each of the Plaintiffs' claims and the Plaintiffs appealed.' 7
On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals determined the
Plaintiffs' claims for strict liability, negligence and breach of express
warranty were not preempted by FIFRA and reversed the summary
judgment for those claims.' However, the court remanded the two claims
of negligent misrepresentation/fraud and violation of the NJCFA to the
district court to determine whether the misrepresentations were oral or
written. 9
On remand, the district court 2ganted summary judgment for
Novartis on all of the Plaintiffs' claims. The district court held that the
claims for negligent misrepresentation/fraud and the claim of a violation
of the NJCFA based on the written material in the brochure were
preempted by FIFRA because the brochure counted as "labeling" and
therefore could not be attacked. 2 1 They also held that even if the claims
were not preempted, the summary judgment still applied because the
Plaintiffs never obtained or used any other written material about the
product before purchasing and applying it. 22 The district court determined
that to the extent the negligent misrepresentation/fraud and NJCFA claims
were based on oral representations about the product, there was no claim
because Novartis never made any oral representations about the product.23
" Id. at 211-12.
15FIFRA is the system of regulation of the use, sale, and labeling of pesticides in the

United States. Id. at 214.
Id. at 212.
17

id.

This decision was based on Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005)
in which the Supreme Court determined the scope of FIFRA preemption.
19Indian Brand Farms, Inc. v. Novartis Crop
Protection Inc., 617 F.3d 207, 212 (3d Cir.
2010).
20
d
21 id
18Id.

22 Id. (citing

Indian Brand Farms, Inc. v. Novartis Crop Protection, Inc., No. 99-2118,
2007 WL 4571087, at 7n. 5 (D.N.J. 2007)).
23 ,,
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As for the strict liability claim for failure to warn, the district court
concluded it was preempted under FIFRA because success on the claim
would introduce a new labelin4 requirement that goes further than the
requirements set forth in FIFRA.
Finally, with respect to the pesticide design defect claim that
Novartis should have known about, the district court concluded that
testing for chemical interactions was unnecessary because there were too
many possible combinations of chemicals to test, and thus "tank mixing"
was not reasonably foreseeable. 25 The Plaintiffs then appealed again to
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.2 6
On this second appeal, the appellate court considered all five of the
Plaintiffs' claims individually and held that the district court erred when it
decided Novartis's brochure qualified as "labeling" under FIFRA.
Therefore, the claims of negligent misrepresentation/fraud and violation of
the NJCFA were not preempted by FIFRA,27 and the court reversed the
grant of summary judgment for those issues. 28 However, that reversal
only applied to the written representations made by Novartis, namely the
brochure, and not to the oral representations. 29 Regarding these claims of
oral misrepresentation, the circuit court affirmed the summary judgment
granted by the lower court. 30 The circuit court reversed the district court's
summary judgment as to the failure to warn claims.3 ' Finally, concerning
the claim regarding the alleged design defect in the product, the circuit
court reversed the summary judgment granted to Novartis because the
evidence had shown the risk of harm was foreseeable and the damage
could have been avoided with a pesticide that did not have an ionic

surfactant. 32

24

Id. (citingIndian BrandFarms, 2007 WL 4571087, at 9).

Indian Brand Farms, Inc. v. Novartis Crop Protection Inc., 617 F.3d 207, 212-13 (3d
2Cir. 2010).
6Id. at 213.
27Id. at 217.
28
1 d. at 220-21.
29
Id. at 220-21.
25

30

Id.

31 Id. at

32

225.

Id. at 228.
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Thus, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded
all findings, except for the summary judgment granted for Novartis against
Indian Brand Farms, one specific group of farmers, because there was no
proof any oral representations were made or relied upon. 33
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. FIFRA Regulations
The FIFRA statutes present a series of regulations stipulating what
pesticides may be sold on the market and explaining all the requirements
pesticides must meet before being sold.34 Under FIFRA regulations each
pesticide must be registered with FIFRA to determine if it effectively does
what the manufacturer claims, to verify its label complies with FIFRA's
prohibition on misbranding, and to ensure it will not harm the environment
"when used with widespread and commonly recognized practice."3 5
There are several ways a pesticide can be misbranded, all due to
label inadequacy. The "label" refers to "the written, printed, or graphic
matter on, or attached to, the pesticide or device or any of its containers or
,,36
wrappers.
Under FIFRA, a pesticide is misbranded if its label has a
"false or misleading" statement." 37 A pesticide is also misbranded if its
label does not have adequate instructions for use of the product or it fails
to caution a consumer of possible dangers.38 It may be misbranded if the
label does not contain an "ingredient statement" on the package. 39 The
ingredient statement must contain all active and inert (inactive) ingredients
and their percentages.4 0 Manufacturers are responsible for complying with
the requirements of every FIFRA regulation, and it is illegal to sell any
pesticide that is misbranded. 4 1
33

Id. at 229.

34

Id. at 214 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(C), (F) (2006)).
§ 136a(c)(5)(A)D) (2006).

357 U.S.C.
367 U.S.C.

7 U.S.C.
7 U.S.C.

136(p)(1).

§ 136(q)(1)(A).
§ 136 (q)(1)(F}-(G).
39 7 U.S.C. § 136(q)(2)(A).

U.S.C. § 136(m)-(n).
7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(1)(E) (2006).

40 7
4'
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Prior to FIFRA's passing, each state individually regulated
pesticides.. However, FIFRA was enacted to create uniform federal
regulations on the use of pesticides.42 Under FIFRA, states can continue
regulating the use and sale of pesticides registered with the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA"), but they cannot allow pesticides that are
prohibited by the EPA to be used or sold in the state.4 3 States also cannot
create or enforce labeling requirements different from, or in addition to,
the requirements of the Act." Therefore, while the states share control of
the sale and use of pesticides with the federal government, the EPA, via
the FIFRA regulations, has exclusive control of the labeling requirements
and can prevent a state from changing or adding to the requirements laid
out in FIFRA.4 5 Under these rules, the federal regulations can only
preempt the state rules regarding labeling if two conditions are met: first,
the state requirement must be "for labeling or packaging," and second,
these requirements must be "in addition to or different from" the
requirements established under FIFRA.4 6
B. Relevant State Laws
In New Jersey, the state law regulating the adequacy of labels
states only that the manufacturer of the product is liable for damages if the
product "failed to contain adequate warnings or instructions. "47 Under the
state law, if the plaintiff brings an action for fraud because the label was
inadequate, the plaintiff must only prove five elements: "(1) a material
misrepresentation of a presently existing or past fact; (2) knowledge or
belief by the defendant of its falsity; (3) an intention that the other person
rely on it; (4) reasonable reliance thereon by the other person; and (5)

42 Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, FederalPreemption ofState Common-Law and Statutory
Claims Pertainingto Herbicides,2 A.L.R. FED. 2d 265, § 2 (2005).
43
4

7 U.S.C. § 136v(a) (2006).
7 U.S.C. § 136v(b).

45 Indian Brand Farms, Inc. v. Novartis Crop Protection Inc., 617 F.3d 207, 214 (3d Cir.
2010) (citing 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2006)).
46
Id. (citing 7 U.S.C. § 136(v)(b) (2006)).
47
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-2 (2000). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
compared these regulations to the FIFRA regulations. Novartis, 617 F.3d at 222-223.
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resulting damages."4 8 Similarly, when trying to prove a claim of negligent
misrepresentation, the plaintiff must show there was "an incorrect
statement, negligently made and justifiably relied upon, [and] may be the
basis for recovery of damages for economic loss . . . sustained as a
consequence of that reliance.' 9
When trying to prove reliance under either of these causes of
action under New Jersey state law, it is sufficient if the plaintiff shows
"indirect reliance," which "allows a plaintiff to prove a fraud action when
he or she heard a statement not from the party that defrauded him or her
but from that party's agent or from someone to whom the party
communicated the false statement with the intention that the victim hear it,
rely on it, and act to his or her detriment."50
C. FederalPreemption of Claims Made Under State Statutes
The United States Supreme Court first encountered the issue of
whether a local regulation is preempted by FIFRA in Wisconsin Public
Intervenor v. Mortier.5 1 In Mortier, the issue was whether FIFRA
preempted a local regulation that required people to get a permit in order
to apply pesticides to public land, to private land used by the public, or for
the application of pesticides to private land by airplanes. 52 The Court
noted the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution declares state laws invalid
if they "interfere with or are contrary to the laws of congress." 5 3
However, the Court previously ruled the only way federal regulations
preempt state laws is through explicit preemptive language, or if the
regulation is written so there is clearly no allowance for state rules to also
apply.54 Additionally, preemption occurs when federal and state laws
conflict.55 Applying these well-established rules together with the text of
48

Novartis, 617 F.3d at 218 (quoting Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 691 A.2d
350,
367 (N.J. 1997)).
49
Id. (quoting H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 142-43 (1983)).
50
d. (quoting Kaufman v. I-Stat Corp., 754 A.2d 1188, 1195 (N.J. 2000)).
' 501 U.S. 597 (1991).
5
2 Id. at 602-03.
53
1d. at 604 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 82 (1824)).
54
Id. at 605 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
ss Id. (citing Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)).
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the statute itself 66 and the legislative history, the Supreme Court decided
FIFRA did not preempt the state regulation of pesticide use, because
FIFRA does not expressly dictate that it supersedes local or state
regulations.5 7
The Supreme Court in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC 8 clarified
whether FIFRA regulations preempt state regulations for issues of claims
for damages.5 9 In Bates, a group of peanut farmers in Texas sued the
manufacturer of a pesticide that they claim damaged their crops.6 0 After
considering the Court's previous decision in Mortier that "the statute
leaves ample room for states and localities to supplement federal efforts
even absent the express regulatory authorization of § 136v(a)," 6 1the Court
concluded that FIFRA does not prevent a state from making violations of
FIFRA labeling provisions a state offense with state-imposed sanctions.62
The Court concluded that since § 136v(b)63 only prohibits states from
adopting labeling requirements that are "in addition to or different from"
FIFRA requirements, a state rule is not preempted as long as it is
consistent or parallel to FIFRA regulations. 64 . The Court adopted this
"parallel requirements" for future use.6 5
IV. INSTANT DECISION

Upon reviewing the District Court's findings, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals made decisions on each of the Plaintiffs' claims in turn.

s6 See 7 U.S.C.

§ 136v (2006) ((a) "[ . .. ] A state may regulate the sale or use of any

federally registered pesticide or device in the State, but only if and to the extent the
regulation does not permit any sale of use prohibited by this subchapter." (b) "[ ... ]
Such State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or
packaging in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter.").
7 Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 606 (1991).
58 544 U.S. 431 (2005).

" See id
6Id at 434.
" Id at 441-42. (citing Wis. Pub. Intervenor, 501 U.S. at 613).
62
Id at 442.
63 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2006).
6 Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 447 (2005).
65

id
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A. FIFRA Preemption Claim
The court's first finding addressed the Plaintiffs' assertion that
none of their claims against Novartis could be preempted by FIFRA
regulations because the EPA, which enforces FIFRA regulations, waived
its authority to have jurisdiction over pesticide efficacy issues. 66 The court
concluded however, that the claims could be preempted for several
reasons. The main reason was that the EPA did not waive its jurisdiction
over efficacy issues because Congress had not authorized them to do so. 6 7
The EPA can only waive its authority to force companies to submit data
requirements related to efficacy when registering a new pesticide."
Secondly, the court concluded that while the efficacy claims could
be preempted, the main issue in this case is not the efficacy of the
pesticide, but its alleged labeling defects.6 9 Therefore, because the case is
not about efficacy but about mislabeling the Plaintiffs' claims about the
alleged mislabeling of the product and their dependence on the written
representations Novartis gave to them were not preempted. 70 The court
then went on to discuss the Plaintiffs claims of negligent
misrepresentation/fraud.
B. Negligent Misrepresentation/Fraud
Claims
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Novartis
on all of the Plaintiffs' fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims, but
the Third Circuit reversed, finding it to be a material question of fact
whether the Plaintiffs could show they relied on the brochure and other
representations of Novartis in choosing the product and believing it safe
for tank mixing.7 ' First, the appellate court determined the marketing
brochure Novartis gave to the retailers and to Rutgers University did not
Indian Brand Farms, Inc. v. Novartis Crop. Prot. Inc.,
617 F.3d 207, 213 (3d Cir.
2010).
67
Id. at 213-14.
6
66

8

69

id
id.

"old at 214.
Id. at 220-21. The Third Circuit did, however, affirm
the district court's granting of
summary judgment against Indian Farms. Id.
7
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qualify as a "label" under FIFRA.7 2 The brochure did not meet the
requirements of a "label" because it was not on or attached to the product,
but was distributed prior to sale. 3 Because the brochure did not constitute
a label, the plaintiffs claims are not preempted by FIFRA regulations. 74
However, the court concluded that the Plaintiffs could sustain a
claim of fraudulent misrepresentation if they could show they relied on a
written representation given by Novartis. 7 5 The brochure created by
Novartis could constitute such a written representation.76 In New Jersey,
to establish fraud the Plaintiffs had to prove they reasonably relied on the
representation along with the other four elements.78 Here, the element of
reasonable reliance was in question because the Plaintiffs claimed they
relied on written and oral representations made by Novartis. 79 The court
determined that in order to prove reliance, it was enough for the Plaintiffs
to show "indirect reliance." Indirect reliance occurs when a plaintiff can
prove that the statement relied upon came not from the party directly, "but
from that party's agent or from someone to whom the party communicated
the false statement with the intention that the victim hear it, rely on it, and
act to his or her detriment." 8 '
Because the Plaintiffs could show they chose to use the product
AG600 because they indirectly relied upon the marketing brochure, the
recommendations of the product by Rutgers University scientists, the
information given at the "twilight meeting," and from reading an article
72

Id. at 216. A "label" under FIFRA is any "written, printed, or graphic matter on, or
attached to, the pesticide or device or any of its containers or wrappers. Id. (quoting 7
U.S.C. § 136(p)(1) (2006)).
73 id.

74

Id. at 218.

75 id.
76 id.

" There are five elements of fraud in New Jersey: "(1) a material misrepresentation of a
presently existing or past fact; (2) knowledge or belief by the defendant of its falsity; (3)
an intention that the other person rely on it; (4) reasonable reliance thereon by the other
person; and (5) resulting damages." Id. (quoting Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 691
A.2d 350, 367 (N.J. 1997)).
78
id.
7 Id. at 218-19.
so Id. at 218.
81 Id. (quoting Kaufman v. I-Stat Corp., 754 A.2d 1188, 1195 (N.J. 2000)).
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about the product in the "Blueberry Bulletin," the court determined that
the Plaintiffs could make a claim for fraud and therefore have enough
evidence to get past summary judgment.82 This ruling only reversed the
summary judgment on the fraud claims based on the written
representations.
Because Plaintiffs could not show any specific oral
representations Novartis made to them, the summary judgment against
claims of oral misrepresentations was affirmed. 84
C. Failureto Warn Claim
The Plaintiffs also argued before the district court that Novartis
was liable for the damage to the blueberry plants because Novartis failed
to warn purchasers of the dangers of tank mixing.8 5 The Plaintiffs claimed
that Novartis's failure to warn of the dangers was a violation of the FIFRA
requirement that labels have sufficient warnings. 86 The circuit court first
considered if this claim was preempted by FIFRA regulations. The court
determined that failure to warn claims are only preempted by the FIFRA
regulations if a ruling in favor of the plaintiff would impose labeling
requirements "in addition to or different from" the requirements in
FIFRA."
To establish whether the Plaintiffs' failure to warn claim would
impose new regulations, the court looked to the state law of New Jersey to
determine what labeling requirements are necessary. In New Jersey, a
manufacturer is only liable for misbranding if the product "failed to
contain adequate warnings or instructions."90 The court ascertained that
the New Jersey legislation does not impose any new or inconsistent duty
that is not imposed by FIFRA's requirements of sufficient labeling. 9 '
82
8

Id. at 220.

1

d. at 220-21.

84
85
id.
86

Id. at 221.

id.
id.
88
89 Id. at 221-22 (quoting Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 447 (2005)).
Id. at 222.
90
Id (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-2 (2000)).
' Id. at 222-23.
87
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Because no new requirements would be imposed, the Plaintiffs' claims for
failure to warn were not preempted by FIFRA. Since the claim was not
preempted, the Plaintiffs were allowed to bring their claim and the
summary udgment granted by the district court to Novartis had to be
reversed. 9
Novartis contended, however, that an EPA "Notice" discussing the
policy of labeling for appropriateness of tank mixing, titled Revised Policy
on Label Claims for Tank Mixing issued in 1982, indicates that
manufacturers only have to warn of potential dangers of tank mixing if the
company is holding the product out as appropriate for tank mixing.93 The
court concluded that the Notice did not apply for several reasons. For
starters, there is a strong presumption against preemption of state law in
failure to warn cases.9 Additionally, the court noted the Notice was
actually issued to applicators/purchasers of pesticides and was not
technically related to the labeling requirements for manufacturers.9 5
However, regardless of what purchasers are expected to know
about the products they buy, manufacturers are required to avoid
misbranding. 96 The Plaintiffs' claims of failure to warn against Novartis
were not preempted by FIFRA regulations because holding for the
Plaintiffs would not impose any new or different standards of labeling on
the Defendants. In view of the fact that Novartis could not show it had no
duty to label, the Third Circuit reversed the summary judgment against
failure to warn claims. 97
D. Design Defect Claims
Finally, the Plaintiffs claimed the product AG600 was defectively
designed because of the ionic surfactant, which caused the damage to the
plants when tank mixed with the fungicides. 9 8 The district court granted
summary judgment to Novartis on this claim, but the Third Circuit
92
93
94

Id. at 224-25.
Id. at 223.
Id. at 224 (citing Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005)).

95 Id.
96id.
97

Id. at 225.
.

9id.
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reversed this decision, finding a genuine issue of material fact existed due
to the evidence available.99 The Third Circuit began by looking at New
Jersey law about strict liability design defect claims and found the plaintiff
must prove the product was not fit for a reasonably foreseeable purpose. 00
Whether a product was fit for a reasonably foreseeable purpose is decided
by determining if the use to which it was put was "objectively
foreseeable."' 0 ' Essentially, a defendant is not liable for damages caused
by misuse unless the misuse was "objectively foreseeable." 02 The court
also noted that not all misuses are reasonably foreseeable, but misuses that
are considered normal and not extraordinary are reasonably foreseeable.1 03
In New Jersey, the determination as to whether a misuse of a product is
objectively foreseeable is for a jury to decide.104
Next, the court determined there was sufficient evidence for a
reasonable jury to find the misuse was foreseeable. 05 The court found
four pieces of evidence that suggested the tank mixing was reasonably
foreseeable. 0 6 First, based on the testimony of the Plaintiffs, tank mixing
was almost inevitable because it is more economical for farmers to apply
all products at once than to apply them one at a time. 0 7 Second, the
Plaintiffs testified that tank mixing is a "common practice among
farmers."
Third, there was evidence that several groups of people,
including product retailers and Rutgers University scientists,
recommended that the farmers tank-mix AG600 with fungicides. 109
Fourth, the record showed that Novartis's own representatives knew tank
mixing was a common practice among farmers."l 0
99

Id. at 228.
'00 Id. at 225.
101Id.

10 2

Id. (quoting Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. v. Arcadian Corp., 189 F.3d 305, 314 (3d
Cir.
1999)).
03
' Id. at 227 (citing Arcadian Corp., 189 F.3d at 314).
04 Id. at 225 (quoting Jurado v. W. Gear Works, 619 A.2d 1312, 1319 (N.J. 1993)).
'osId. at 225-26.
'0o1d. at 226.
1078d
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Based on these evidentiary findings, the court concluded that it
was possible for a jury to determine tank mixing of AG600 was a
reasonably foreseeable use of the product and this was a normal and not
extraordinary use; therefore, the summary judgment was reversed and
remanded for the Plaintiffs to bring their claims of design defect."'
V. COMMENT
The Supreme Court in Bates clarified the issue of when FIFRA
regulations preempt state laws on the matter of pesticides and labeling.H2
However in making this ruling, the Supreme Court did not clarify what
exactly qualifies as a label. Since Bates, a new issue has arisen as to what
is and is not a label. Determining what constitutes a label is essential to
manufacturers, sellers and buyers because the ambiguity leaves many
parties open to civil, and possibly even criminal liabilities, if a mistake is
made.
In deciding the claim against Novartis, the Third Circuit relied on
the precedent established in Bates and determined that any of the
blueberry farmers' claims of a flawed label would be preempted if the
state regulations regarding labels imposed any supplemental duties on the
manufacturer other than those outlined in FIFRA." 3 However, the issue
was more complicated because -the farmers did not rely on a label attached
to the product, but on an oral representation of the product and a written
report called the "Blueberry Bulletin," both of which were given by third
parties who relied on pamphlets supplied by Novartis.H 4 The court had to
determine if the advertising literature about the product fell within the
label category, because if it did then the representations given to the
farmers would be considered labels and the claims would be preempted. 5
To accomplish this, the court had to focus on the FIFRA regulations." 6

"n Id. at 228.
112 Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 444 (2005).
113 Indian Brand Farms, Inc. v. Novartis Crop Prot. Inc., 617 F.3d 207, 214 (3d Cir.
2010).
14 Id. at 211.

'"Id.at 215.
"Id. at 215-16.

327

WHAT'S IN A LABEL?

Under FIFRA, a "label" is "the written, printed, or graphic matter
on, or attached to, the pesticide or device or any of its containers or
wrappers."1 FIFRA then defines "labeling" as "all labels and all other
written, printed, or graphic matter (A) accompanying the pesticide or
device at any time; or (B) to which reference is made on the label or in
literature accompanying the pesticide or device ....
The court noted
that while the brochure was clearly not "on or attached to" the product, it
still qualified as "all other written, printed, or graphic matter." 119
However, since the brochure was not referenced on the label attached to
the product, the only way to determine if the brochure qualified as
"labeling" is to discover if it was "accompanying" the product."120
This presents the crux of the issue that could potentially affect
manufacturers, sellers and buyers across the country; when a case boils
down to whether a potential label is "accompanying" a product, the
authority is sparse as to what exactly "accompanying" means.
The Supreme Court has not ruled as to what "accompanying"
means under FIFRA regulations, however the Court has established the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act's definition of "labeling" to mean
"all
labels
and
other
written,
printed,
or
graphic
matter[. . . ]accompanying such article." 21 The Court concluded a drug
label "accompanying such article" is something that "supplements or
explains it,[ ... ]No physical attachment one to the other is necessary. It
is the textual relationship that is significant."l 22 The Court noted Congress
did not intend the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act to cover drug
advertising material, but it did intend to cover advertising material that
"performs the same function as if it were on the article or on the containers
or wrappers." l23 Therefore, under Kordel v. United States', drug
advertising that instructs users how to use the drugs, though not attached
to or given with the drug itself, is considered labeling.
U.S.C. § 136(p)(1) (2006).
7 U.S.C. § 136(p)(2).
" 9Novartis, 617 F.3d at 216.
120 id.
121Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S.
345, 347-48 (1948); see 21 U.S.C. § 321(m) (2006).
22
Kordel, 335 U.S. at 350 (emphasis
added).
23 Id. at 351.
124 335 U.S. 345 (1948).
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In New York State Pesticide Coalition, Inc. v. Jorling,125 the
Second Circuit determined that, "labeling is better understood by its
relationship, rather than its proximity, to the product" and that labeling "is
designed to be read and followed by the end user." 126
The Third Circuit in Novartis considered both the Supreme Court
in Kordel and the Second Circuit in Jorling and determined the marketing
brochure was not a label because it was not intended to supplement the
label. 127 The purpose of the brochure was not to tell prospective buyers
how to use the product, but only to advertise the product and inform
buyers about the benefits of the product.12 8 Therefore, because the
brochure did not contain instructions for use, the court determined it was
not a label and the farmer's claim of reliance on the brochure was not

preempted by FIFRA.129
The lack of case law on the meaning of "accompanying" leaves
room for various circuits to interpret the term differently, which could
potentially lead to splits among the courts in determining whether state
law claims are preempted by FIFRA regulations. For FIFRA to preempt
state law, a court has to find that the alleged label actually be a label
accompanying the product. If circuits can vary on how they interpret the
term "accompanying," this might lead to inequitable application of federal
regulations across the country.
In Missouri and the Eighth Circuit, no court has yet determined
how the word "accompanying" will be interpreted and applied. The
Missouri Supreme Court has not even heard a case on pesticide claim
preemption by FIFRA. Two cases from the Missouri Court of Appeals for
the Southern District indicate how Missouri courts might determine when
pesticide label claims are preempted.13 0 In M & H Enterprisesv. Tri-State

874 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1989). Jorlingis the only federal appellate decision specifically
about the meaning of "accompanying" under FIFRA.
126 Id. at 119.
127 Indian Brand Farms, Inc. v. Novartis Crop Prot., Inc., 617 F.3d 207, 216-18 (3d Cir.
2010).
125

128 id.

129

d

130 See

M & H Enters. v. Tri-State Delta Chems., Inc., 984 S.W.2d 175 (Mo. App. S.D.
1998); Yowell v. Chevron Chem. Co., 836 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. App. S.D. 1992).
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Delta Chemicals, Inc. , the court held that label based state common law
claims are always preempted by FIFRA regulations.1 32 The plaintiffs
argued the label stated that the product would kill certain insects.
However, after using the product the insects were not killed and proceeded
to destroy the plaintiffs' crops.
The court concluded the claims were
based solely on the label itself, and thus were preempted because the label
complied with FIFRA standards and was approved by the EPA.134
The same court made a similar decision in Yowell v. Chevronl35
when it determined that the plaintiffs claim against the defendant
company was based entirely on the label, and therefore preempted.13 1
Consequently, the only way in Missouri to avoid federal preemption is to
plead the case in such a way as to avoid discussion of the label. One way
to do this is to make a claim under the Missouri products liability
statute.' 3 1
While Missouri and the Eighth Circuit have yet to rule on a case
where the controversy is whether something other than what is attached to
the product is a label, it is likely the courts will follow the persuasive
authority of the Second and Third Circuits. However, there is a possibility
of a split among the circuits. If this happens the federal regulations will be
applied inconsistently, which could cause difficulties for companies
wanting to sell their product in many states across the country.
Since state regulations cannot be more intrusive than FIFRA
regulations, 1 a company need only comply with FIFRA to be in
compliance with state regulations. However, if the regulations are applied
inconsistently across the country, it becomes increasingly difficult to
conduct business effectively. It will cost manufacturers more money to
131M

& H Enters. v. Tri-State Delta Chems., Inc., 984 S.W.2d 175
(Mo. App. S.D. 1998)
132 Id at 180.
Id. at 177.
34 Id at 177, 183.
13 Yowell v. Chevron Chem. Co., 836 S.W.2d 62 (Mo.
App. S.D. 1992).
Id at 66.
137In Missouri, the contents of a products
liability claim are listed in Mo. REV. STAT. §
537.760 (2000). The statute provides that a plaintiff can bring a claim against a
manufacturer on the theory that the manufacturer put the product into the stream of
commerce, the plaintiff used the product in a reasonable manner and the product was
either defective or unreasonably dangerous.
"3 7 U.S.C. § 136(v)(b) (2000).
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make and distribute products if they have to use different marketing,
selling and labeling practices across the country. It could add to the
already overburdened dockets in federal courts. All of this will cost
businesses more money, causing purchasers to pay more for products,
which could potentially raise the cost of food.
While this scenario might seem unlikely, it would be helpful if the
Supreme Court would deliver a ruling declaring specifically how to
interpret the word "accompanying" and state explicitly what it does and
does not cover. The possible consequences of not having a controlling
precedent for every circuit are potentially problematic, and a decision
would make these cases much easier for the lower courts, or even prevent
these cases from arising in the first place.
VI. CONCLUSION

The potential for confusion over what does and does not qualify as
a label shows that there is a need for controlling precedent by the Supreme
Court to clarify what the term "accompanying" means under the FIFRA
regulations. The blueberry farmers' case was recently remanded back to
the district court for the second time because of the confusion created in
determining what qualifies as a label. Controlling precedent would solve
this problem, conserve judicial economy and save farmers and pesticide
manufacturers time and money.
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